Default contagion is a concern especially after witnessing the financial crisis. How the financial institutions are connected is crucial to how likely they will default together.
Introduction
During the financial crisis, the government had to spend billions of dollars to bail-out large banks. The argument was that the default of these large banks would result in the domino effect which would cause defaults of other banks and eventually the collapse of the entire financial system. However, there is little information about how these banks are connected and which banks are worth saving. This paper intends to study how banks are interconnected using observable data.
The knowledge of how banks are connected is crucial to the understanding of systemic risk. 2 Banks are not required to disclose their positions with other banks, and thus this information is not observable. 3 The network structure is an important input into the network model such as Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . Correlation matrix of stock returns is generally used to address the level of interconnectivity. However, it is a rather crude measure which only addresses pairwise interconnectivity of any two banks. Is there a way to learn about the structure of the whole network in a consistent way from the available data?
This paper proposes learning the connection structure from observable data. In the computer science or engineering literature, a method called probabilistic graphical model has been developed to address a general problem of connection structure of random variables. The model has been applied to learn consumer behavior from their shopping histories. Such knowledge can then be applied to recommend other shopping items. Another popular application is in medical diagnosis where the system learns about the connection structure of diseases and symptoms. With a well-trained system, patients can report symptoms and the system can compute the most likely cause. An example of scientific discovery using this method is Sachs et al. (2005) who use machine learning techniques to learn the causal protein signaling networks from multi-parameter single-cell data. Since the model is general in nature, we can apply this model to learn about the connection structure of financial institutions.
When defaults are concerned, credit default swaps (CDS) data will be the most appropriate source of information. 4 If the market is efficient, prices of securities will reflect all available information. During the financial crisis, stock prices and CDS spreads of many financial institutions moved together. During the European debt crisis, the spreads of sovereign credit default swaps also moved together. The market expects one firm's default will increase another firm's default probability. While data in many markets are available, CDS data tie directly to default probabilities, and thus are the most direct information source for default contagion. One potential concern is that the nonlinearity of CDS spreads may not be compatible with the graphical model, which usually requires a linear relationship between variables. Kitwiwattanachai and Pearson (2014) develop a model to link CDS spreads to the distance-to-default, that will linearize the CDS dynamics and make the data appropriate for the graphical model.
In practice, one may simply use a log transformation to alleviate concerns about model misspecification, but the calculation for default probability and expected loss will still rely on the model. How important is the spillover effect to default correlations? Glasserman and Young (2013) show that expected losses from network effects are actually small regardless of network topology. Using data from the European Banking Authority (EBA), they show that banks are more likely to default from common shocks, rather than from the spillover effect from other banks through the network. From the surface, network structure seems to matter less than we thought. However, they mention that losses from spillover effects are small unless shocks are magnified by some other mechanism, such as bankruptcy costs and mark-to-market revaluations of assets. Borrower's deteriorating credit quality can create mark-tomarket losses for a lender well before the point of default. Learning network structure 4 It is worth clarifying that this paper is not about CDS trading positions of banks, but rather the probability of default of banks and how these probabilities are connected. In other words, we try to learn how default probabilities are connected using the CDS data as a proxy.
from CDS data will find the connection structure according to the market perception (or under the risk-neutral measure). This will account for the mark-to-market values of financial institutions and thus shed light on how the market will value other nodes when one node defaults. Such network structure can address the amplifying mechanism that will magnify the expected losses beyond simple spillover effects.
The input for the model is the CDS data for each financial institution. The data are first transformed into a log scale and then regressed on systematic risk factors, such as market returns and implied volatility (VIX), to filter out the systematic risks that affect all the nodes. The residuals are then passed through the Bayesian network model where algorithms find the network structure with the highest BIC score (likelihood score with penalty for more complex network). Parameters are then estimated from the learned network structure. The learned network structure together with parameters is then used to calculate conditional default probability and expected conditional loss. In theory, when all factors or all relevant nodes in the network are observable, and data and computational power are unlimited, the learned network structure will converge to the true network. In practice, this ideal condition is usually not the case. After the calculation of the main network structure, I also extend the model by adding a couple of omitted nodes (Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch) back to the model.
The resulting network structure is largely similar to the previous one, but also contains some significant and nontrivial changes. On the one hand, the model is relatively robust to the choice of financial institutions to include in the calculation. On the other hand, since there are significant changes to the network structure, the model implementation and interpretation still rely on the domain knowledge and judgment of the researcher. This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to apply the probabilistic graphical model to uncover network structure of financial institutions. The immediate benefit of such network structure is the ability to calculate conditional default probability and expected conditional loss, which can help gauge the systemic risk or whether any bank is too-big-to-fail. Reference books for probabilistic graphical model include Daphne and Friedman (2009) and Murphy (2012). Nagarajan et al. (2013) and Scutari and Denis (2014) include software implementation in R together with examples from biology. Sachs et al. (2005) apply the probabilistic graphical model to scientific discovery in protein signaling. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show the impact of network connection on default contagion while Glasserman and Young (2013) show that such contagion is unlikely. Kitwiwattanachai and Pearson (2014) explore default correlations using CDS data and structural models but do not attempt to uncover the connection structure.
The recent paper examining the network structure using security prices is Billio et al. (2012) . They propose econometric measures of connectedness based on principal component analysis and Granger causality. My paper instead uses a probabilistic graphical model and compares the results with Granger causality. This paper further demonstrates the calculation of conditional default probability and expected conditional loss, which is the relative advantage of using CDS data, and was absent in Billio et al. (2012) who used equity returns. This paper belongs to a strand of literature investigating the impact of default contagion or systemic risk in general.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a background for the probabilistic graphical model. Section 2 provides theoretical dynamics and distribution of CDS spreads. Section 3 provides empirical analysis using CDS data and shows the network structure implied from the CDS data. Section 4 explores implications of the learned network structure, in particular conditional default probabilities and expected conditional loss. Section 5 extends the model by adding a few omitted nodes to the calculation. Section 6 concludes.
Probabilistic Graphical Model
This section provides a brief introduction to the probabilistic graphical model. A complete treatment can be found in Koller and Friedman (2009) or Scutari and Denis (2014).
Bayesian Network Representation
A graphical model is composed of a set of random variables X = {X 1 , X 2 , ..., X p } describing the quantities of interest (in this case, the CDS spreads of financial institutions). The multivariate probability distribution of X is called the global distribution of the data while the univariate distribution associated with each X i ∈ X is called local distribution.
A directed acyclic graph (DAG), denoted G = (V, A), is composed of nodes v ∈ V and directed arcs a ∈ A. Each node v corresponds to one variable X i ∈ X. The arc a represents probabilistic dependency. If there is an arc from X i to X j , it means that X j depends on X i . X i is a parent of X j , and X j is a child of X i . In the context of linear regression, X j is the dependent variable and X i is the independent variable. Furthermore, if there is a path leading from X i to X j , X i is called ancestor of X j , and X j is called descendant of X i . A cycle is not allowed in DAG, i.e., there cannot be a path from any X i back to X i . 
where P a X i is the set of parents of X i . For the student example, the global distribution
Structure and Parameter Learning
If the network structure and parameters are available, the Bayesian network can be used for inference, such as finding the probability of a good grade given the information about difficulty and intelligence. However, if the network structure and parameters are not available, one must first find the structure and parameters through model selection and estimation, also called learning from the machine learning literature.
Bayesian network learning is performed as a two-step process, structure learning and parameter learning. Structure learning finds the most likely network structure given the data, similar to maximum likelihood over all the configurations of network structures.
Parameter learning then estimates the parameters of each node by maximum likelihood over the parameter space. This step concerns only with the local distribution, thus avoiding the curse of dimensionality.
To be precise, let the Bayesian network model be represented by a pair
where G is the network structure and θ G is the associated parameters. Bayesian network learning involves maximizing the likelihood score:
where L(.) is the chosen likelihood score function and D is the given data. In other words, to find the maximum likelihood < G, θ G > pair, we should find the graph structure G that achieves the highest likelihood, using the MLE parameters for G (θ G ).
Define:
where
Bayesian network learning thus means finding G that maximizes the score L (G : D).
Similar to model selection problem, for structure learning, a major limitation of the likelihood score (score L (G : D)) is that it always prefers complex structures (with more connections) over simple ones. The likelihood score always increases with an additional arc between the nodes. Thus, the maximum likelihood network will usually be a fully connected one. To avoid overfitting, Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is introduced as an alternative score function:
where N is the number of observations and Dim [G] is the model dimension, or the number of independent parameters in G. The BIC score penalizes more complex models by the second term (Dim [G] ). The BIC score has been shown to be consistent, i.e., as N → ∞, the true G will have the maximum BIC score. Bayesian network learning thus means finding G that maximizes the score BIC (G : D), using the likelihood computed from the decomposition in (1).
Equivalence Class and CPDAG
Two DAGs can have the same score and thus belong to the same equivalence class. For example, consider two DAGs,
from these two DAGs are the same as shown below:
Bayesian network learning cannot differentiate between the DAGs in the same equivalence class because they have the same likelihood. An equivalence class can be represented by completed partially directed graph (CPDAG). For CPDAG, arcs that are necessary for the score and ensure no cycle will maintain directions. The remaining arcs will still be present but do not preserve directions, becoming undirected arcs. The CPDAG for the example two DAGs is X i − X j − X k . An example of structures that must maintain arc directions is the v-structure, X i → X j ← X k .
Algorithms and Model Averaging
The space of network structures is not continuous. Thus, one cannot use simple optimization algorithms to obtain the highest BIC score. Moreover, there are a prohibitively large number of possible configurations of network structures, making it impossible to enumerate all possible BIC scores for a network of reasonable size. One must use a search algorithm to obtain the network structure with the highest BIC score.
There are many search algorithms in the literature but for this paper I will focus only on the hill-climbing algorithm. The algorithm explores the search space starting from a network structure (usually an empty network without any arc) and adding, deleting or reversing one arc at a time until the score can no longer be improved. As is common for any greedy algorithm, the solution obtained may be the local instead of global maximum. One can use random restart to make sure that the global maximum is obtained.
Several networks may have similar scores and one may not be comfortable choosing only the network with the highest score to represent the true structure. One can improve the quality of the structure learned by averaging over multiple CPDAGs. One possible approach is to apply bootstrap resampling of the data and learn a set of network structures, say 1000. The final average structure will contain the arcs that are present in the majority, say 85%, of the set of learned structures and in the direction that appears most frequently. The significance threshold for the arcs to be present in the final average structure can be set by the user or one can use the default threshold from the software package.
CDS Dynamics
Most software packages for Bayesian network allow only discrete or Gaussian random variables, and only a linear relationship among them. CDS data are not discrete (although discretization algorithm is also available to transform the continuous data into discrete). This section considers if the CDS data can fit the Gaussian distribution.
Each node in the Bayesian network is a financial institution with the corresponding CDS data. Kitwiwattanachai and Pearson (2014) provide a link between CDS dynamics and asset dynamics. I briefly discuss the setup and results here while full details can be looked up in the paper.
As is standard in structural models, the underlying asset value V follows a geometric Brownian motion. Under the risk-neutral probability,
where r is the interest rate, σ is the asset return volatility, and W is a Brownian motion. Default occurs when the asset value reaches a default boundary with time u value B(u) that grows at a deterministic rate equal to the expected growth rate of ln V under the risk-neutral probability, i.e.
B(u)
Consider the distance-to-default m(V (t), B(t)) = ln(V (t)/B(t))/σ. The default event that the asset value V reaches the boundary B is identical to the event that the distance-to-default reaches zero. Using (6) and the solution to (5), the distance-to-
is a Brownian motion with initial value
The dynamic of distance-to-default is Gaussian, which is the assumed distribution for the Bayesian network. While there are other extensions of this basic model in Kitwiwattanachai and Pearson (2014), I focus only on this basic model for the approximate distribution.
The remaining missing link is the map between CDS spreads and distance-todefault. Kitwiwattanachai and Pearson (2014) also shows that CDS spreads (S) can be written as a function of distance-to-default (m) = S(m). Figure 2 shows the plot between CDS spreads and distance-to-default from the model. In principle, one can then invert the plot to find distance-to-default (m) from CDS spreads (S) and obtain the distance-to-default dynamics as an input to the probabilistic graphical model.
However, one may be uncomfortable trusting the model in the first place.
To alleviate the concern of model misspecification, I use the log of CDS spreads instead. Figure 3 shows the plot between the log of CDS spreads and the distanceto-default. The plot is almost linear with some nonlinearities when CDS spreads are extremely high (distance-to-default is extremely low) on the left end. The linear relationship motivates the assumption that the dynamic of the log of CDS spreads is Gaussian, because the dynamic of the distance-to-default itself is Gaussian (see equation (8)). Thus, for the purposes of Bayesian network learning, I use log of CDS spreads as an input to the model. We will investigate the normality assumption of the log of CDS spreads again in the empirical analysis in section 3.2.3.
For the purposes of inference, such as computing conditional default probability and expected conditional loss, however, one needs the implied distance-to-default from the model. Thus, after learning the network structure and parameters, I return to the model to calculate distance-to-default and default probabilities. Table 1 shows the name and market capitalization of the banks in the data set. The list includes mostly big US banks. The market capitalization is calculated as of January 2007 to avoid the impact of financial crisis. Table 2 shows summary statistics of CDS data during the sample period. The statistics are calculated both on raw spreads in basis points and log of spreads. All of the banks have relatively low CDS spreads and thus low default probabilities before the financial crisis. The mean and standard deviation of CDS spreads are also not very different across banks. 
Empirical Analysis
Since the main focus is on the connection between financial institutions, I first filter out the systematic factors that will affect all CDS spreads. The risk factors that affect 
where ∆ denotes weekly changes, R m,t is the S&P500 weekly returns at time t, and VIX is the CBOE implied volatility. The residuals i,t in theory should be normally distributed and will be used for the Bayesian network learning.
Comparison with Granger Causality
As mentioned before, a simple correlation matrix or linear regression cannot establish the network structure because the direction of causality can go either way. A typical method to establish causality in economics is Granger causality or Vector Autoregression (VAR). By running regression of one variable on the lagged value of other variables, causality can be determined because only the past can determine the future, but not vice versa. In this section I run VAR with the CDS data to see if the network structure can be found this way.
I run VAR(1) regression using the residuals obtained from (9) . In this setup, VAR is equivalent to running separate linear regressions. For example, for AIG:
The same regression can be run for CDS data for all firms by changing the left-hand side. The significance of the coefficient can establish the direction of causality from the regressor to the dependent variable on the left hand side. Table 3 shows an example of VAR results for AIG, GS and LEH in columns 1, 2, and 3 accordingly. The first column suggests that CITI, LEH and UBS can cause AIG's spreads to move. However, CITI and UBS are marginally significant at 10% significance level. Moreover, even though LEH is highly significant, the sign is negative, indicating that an increase in LEH's CDS will reduce AIG's CDS. This result goes against the intuition of systemic risk that one firm's default risk will increase another firm's default risk.
The second column suggests that CITI, LEH and WFC can affect GS's default risk.
However, LEH and WFC have the negative sign. GS is also negatively autocorrelated, suggesting a mean reversion process, which does not exist in AIG. The third column suggests that AIG can affect LEH's default risk with a positive sign. This result creates a problem because AIG can Granger-cause LEH, while LEH can also Granger-cause AIG. The final direction is undetermined.
VAR results are not convincing because of the negative coefficients instead of positive and undetermined direction of causality. CDS spread changes may not be appropriate for Granger causality test because changes in prices may mostly be contemporaneous, if the market is efficient.
Software Packages for Bayesian Network
The theory and algorithms for probabilistic graphical model are well developed. There are many software packages that implement algorithms to construct and manipulate the Bayesian network model with different focuses and functionalities. This paper uses the R package bnlearn, which implements discrete and Gaussian Bayesian network together with structure learning, parameter learning and inference algorithms. The package has been used mostly in the biological research area.
To visualize the Bayesian network, I use another R package Rgraphviz which can interact with bnlearn. The Bayesian network graph generated for this paper is the product of these software packages. See Appendix for examples of specific functions used to generate results. S&P 500 has lower standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, and thus is closer to a normal distribution.
Node Distribution
While the distributions of the nodes are not perfectly Gaussian, the maximum likelihood algorithm (in this case, maximizing the BIC score) should still find the most likely network structure. Such exercise is similar to the argument that Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) can be used for nonnormal distribution if only the mean and standard deviation are concerned. The resulting estimates are consistent but not efficient, and thus the resulting network structure will also be consistent.
Further development can extend the software library to accept distributions other than Gaussian and define the score for nonnormal distributions to maximize accordingly.
The main concern will be for inference when computing the conditional default probability, because the probability will depend on the assumed distribution. This paper maintains the Gaussian assumption, but Bayesian network simulation with nonnormal distribution is also available in R package such as rjags or the general package JAGS (Just Another Gibbs Sampler).
Learned Bayesian Network
Each node in the Bayesian network is normally distributed. The data for each node are obtained from the residuals in (9) . The log transformation and (8) ensure linearity and normal distribution. With the specified input, the software package uses hillclimbing algorithm to find the network structure with the highest BIC score. To ensure robustness, model averaging using bootstrap samples is performed and the final result is the network structure containing arcs that are present in the majority of the learned structures, in the direction that appears most frequently.
The learned Bayesian network is shown in Figure 6 . The corresponding CPDAG is shown in Figure 7 . The learned parameters are reported in Table 5 . The R code to generate these results is in the Appendix. Figure 6 shows the relationship between financial institutions as implied by the CDS data. For example, GS can affect WFC, WFC can affect LEH, and LEH can affect AIG. GS can also affect DB which then affects AIG. The CPDAG in Figure 7 is similar to DAG in Figure 6 but some arcs, such as GS → M S and GS → BAC, lose direction. This indicates that the direction can go either way, and the BIC score will be the same. For this network, the learning algorithm cannot differentiate between Simply looking at the network structure can inform policy makers for their decision, but more precise answers can be delivered from such a network model. Next section discusses interesting queries that can be answered by the model.
GS → M S and M S → GS, or GS → BAC and BAC → GS.

Implications
Once the Bayesian network model and parameters have been learned, one can answer probabilistic questions using the model. In the context of systemic risk, we are concerned with conditional default probability and expected conditional loss. One can also use an alternative model if needed while maintaining the same network structure learned previously. Table 6 shows the distance-to-default of all firms in the network as of 31 July With the distance-to-default one can calculate the corresponding default probabilities as the probability that m falls below 0 within a certain period, typically 1 year.
The bnlearn package also provides a simulation capability for such computation. To calculate 1-year probability, the variance needs to be adjusted to be the variance for m, not for the log of CDS spreads. With the guidance from (8), I readjust the variance to 1 for all nodes. As mentioned earlier, the default probability will be calculated assuming normal distribution.
The corresponding default probabilities are reported in the last column of Table   6 and the code is available in the Appendix. In general firms with low CDS spreads will also have low default probabilities. Most firms have very low default probabilities below 1 %, except for LEH, AIG and MS, with LEH leading at almost 5%. Network structure also plays a role in default probabilities -firms lower in the network chain can receive uncertainty from firms on top of the network, and thus have higher default probability even with similar distance-to-default (for example, GS and BARCLAYS)
Conditional Default Probability
The interesting question is "what will happen if firm X defaults?" The model can simulate conditional default probability by setting the distance-to-default of the firm of interest to be below 0, and examine the probability that other firms' distance-todefault also fall below 0. The horizon of interest is 1 year. Table 7 shows the results for conditional default probabilities. Panel A shows the probability calculated from the network structure. Since we are interested in the additional default probability for other firms if the firm of interest defaults, Panel B shows the difference between the conditional default probability and the original default probability in Table 6 . The left column is the firm of interest. The Influence column shows Default probabilities of children and descendants increase substantially if the parents default. From unconditional probability below 1%, the conditional default probabilities can increase to 10% or 20%, and in some cases over 60% if the link is strong.
GS's default can affect almost all other nodes in the network because GS sits on top of the network, with the strongest impact on LEH and MS. LEH's default, on the other hand, only increases default probability of AIG to 8.88%, a substantial amount but relatively low compared to other nodes in the network. On the other hand, LEH is affected tremendously by defaults of its ancestors, BAC, CITI, GS, MS and WFC, each driving up LEH's default probability up to around 30%, and in some cases over 60%.
Expected Conditional Loss
The Bayesian network model allows us to calculate conditional default probability.
The next immediate question is the expected conditional loss from the default, i.e., "what is the expected loss to other firms if firm X defaults?" With the available conditional default probability, finding expected loss is relatively straightforward. I multiply conditional default probability in Panel B of Table 7 with the corresponding market capitalization from Table 1 . I assume that all the equity will be wiped out in case of default. Additional loss to debtholders many incur but is not considered here. The result is the expected incremental loss, which is purely from the systemic risk as a result of other firm's default, in addition to the firm's own expected loss from systematic factors and its own activity. Table 8 reports the results for expected loss. The cumulative loss is the sum of all the expected losses conditional on the node's default. Ranking can also be assigned based on the cumulative loss. As expected, the nodes on top of the network rank high on the expected loss. GS, BAC and MS are systemically more important than UBS, AIG and JPM. While GS seems extremely important with cumulative loss near $200 billion, one must keep in mind that this is partly due to the assumed arc direction GS → M S and GS → BAC, which is the most frequent direction obtained from the learning algorithm. However, as CPDAG in Figure 7 shows, the arc direction can point to the opposite direction without changing the likelihood of the network. The opposite arc direction will also change the expected loss attributed to GS, BAC and MS.
Should Lehman Brothers have been saved? Since the expected loss is only $13.25 billion (excluding its own loss), the answer is probably no.
Extensions
So far we have learned the network structure of firms that survived the financial crisis, except for Lehman Brothers which has been included to answer the hypothetical question. The purpose of the exercise is demonstrative rather than comprehensive. Many firms are omitted for the advantage of interpretation. 5 In this section I add a few more firms to the Bayesian network calculation. The firms of interest are Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch, which were important firms before the financial crisis, but were acquired by other firms rather than facing a default as Lehman Brothers.
We will learn that the network structure with additional firms maintains the basic structure, but also exhibits differences from the network learned in the previous section.
Thus, the network structure learning exercise is not a simple mechanical process, but requires deep domain knowledge of the user to select relevant firms and interpret the results.
Adding Bear Sterns
Bear Sterns was a prominent investment bank and securities trading and brokerage firm that failed in the 2008 financial crisis, and was sold to JPMorgan Chase. The CDS data for Bear Sterns are available from January 2001 to July 2008. As the network model requires complete data for all nodes, the CDS data used for this section end on 7 July 2008 for all firms, and thus are somewhat shorter than the data used in the analysis so far which extend to August 2008. 6 The symbol for Bear Sterns is BSC. Figure 8 shows the learned Bayesian network with Bear Sterns, and Figure 9 the corresponding CPDAG. The network structure is similar to the previous one with GS, MS and BAC at the top, AIG, DB and UBS at the bottom, and JPM isolated from other nodes. 7 BSC stands relatively high in the network, just below GS and MS, and can influence CITI, LEH, WFC and BARCLAYS. LEH is now connected to BARCLAYS, and through BARCLAYS can influence DB, AIG and UBS. Thus, under this network structure, LEH's default will have more impact to the financial system. Interestingly, BSC is connected directly to LEH, indicating that when BSC is in trouble, the next troubling firm will be LEH, which is what we observed in 2008.
Overall, the main network and connection structure remain similar to before, but there are also a few significant changes.
Adding Merrill Lynch
Merill Lynch was another prominent financial institution that did not make it through However, as the dataset will include Bear Sterns, only the data up until 7 July 2008 are used. The symbol for Merrill Lynch is MER. Figure 10 shows the learned Bayesian network with Bear Sterns, and Figure 11 the corresponding CPDAG. The network structure is similar to before. MER stands relatively high in the network, just below GS and MS but above BAC. Curiously, this connection between MER and BAC may also hint at the reason why MER was acquired by BAC, and not other firms. LEH can still influence BARCLAYS, which then influences DB, AIG and UBS. Curiously, this connection between LEH and BAR-CLAYS may also hint at the reason why BARCLAYS purchased LEH's North American investment-banking and trading divisions (along with the headquarter building), after bankruptcy, and not other firms. 9 Interestingly, both BSC and MER can influence LEH. In fact, LEH is the only firm directly impacted by both BSC and MER. Thus, when BSC and MER are in trouble, the next troubling firm will be LEH. This is also what we observed during the financial crisis. BSC and MER, however, were acquired by JPM and BAC, while LEH could not find an acquirer and eventually had to declare bankruptcy.
Overall, the learned network structure is relatively robust to additional nodes. However, there are a few significant and nontrivial changes. Nevertheless, the network structure reflects the relationship among firms, similar to what we observed during the financial crisis.
The Bayesian network is useful to learn about the connection structure of firms, and gauge the impact of a firm's default to the rest of the network. In a perfect case, when all the factors (or relevant nodes) are known and included in the network, with infinite amount of data and computational power, the learned network structure will be the true structure. In the real world, however, perhaps not all factors that drive CDS 
Conclusion
This paper applies the probabilistic graphical model to learn the network structure of financial institutions from CDS data. The learned structure and parameters can be used to compute conditional default probability and expected conditional loss. The impact of default of one firm can be gauged, allowing policy makers to make decisions on the too-big-to-fail problem. Since the information is extracted from the CDS data, all quantities are under the risk-neutral measure, and thus account for the market fear that can trigger bank run.
The log transformation of the CDS data is sufficient to linearize the CDS dynamics, Future research may include refining the distributions of each node in the network and extend the library to include nonnormal distributions. This will improve the estimates for conditional default probability and expected conditional loss. Future research on systemic risk can be built on such platform using the learned network structure as a starting point. Finally, the probabilistic graphical model is a generic mathematical and computational tool which has been successfully applied in the domain of computer science and biology. Finance can also benefit from this well-developed tool, because nowadays everything is connected and network is becoming increasingly important.
Appendix: R Code
load(Data) #CDS data (log residauls) bootCDS =boot.strength(data=Data, R = 1000, algorithm="hc", algorithm.args=list(score="bic-g"))
#learn 
#calculating unconditional default probability cpquery(modfitbn , event = (AIG < -(DDList$AIG)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (BAC < -(DDList$BAC)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (BARCLAYS < -(DDList$BARCLAYS)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (CITI < -(DDList$CITI)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (DB < -(DDList$DB)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^8) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (GS < -(DDList$GS)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^8) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (JPM < -(DDList$JPM)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (LEH < -(DDList$LEH)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (MS < -(DDList$MS)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (UBS < -(DDList$UBS)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) cpquery(modfitbn , event = (WFC < -(DDList$WFC)) , evidence = TRUE, n = 10^7) #Conditional default probability (example) #AIG default probability , if LEH defaults cpquery(modfitbn , event = (AIG < -(DDList$AIG)) , evidence = (LEH < -(DDList$LEH)), n = 4*10^7) #LEH default probability , if GS defaults cpquery(modfitbn , event = (LEH < -(DDList$LEH)) , evidence = (GS < -(DDList$GS)), n = 4*10^7) Table 7 : Conditional default probability. Panel A shows conditional default probability calculated from the learned network structure. Panel B shows the increase in default probability from the original default probability in Table 6 . calculated from the product of increase in default probability in Panel B of Table 7 and market capitalization in Table 1 .
Cumulative is the sum of all expected losses. Ranking shows ranking by Cumulative. 
